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Introduction
In [15] and [16] , the term fail-stop was introduced in the context of shared-memory distributed systems. A fail-stop processor was defined as a processor of which the only visible effects of a failure are: (1) t,he processor stops executing; (2) the processor's internal state and the contents of its volatile memory are lost; (3) other nonfaulty processors can detect the failure. It was also assumed that processes have stable storage whose contents are not lost when a failure occurs.
Since then, the term "fail-stop" has been applied to asynchronous message-passing systems as well. The fail-stop failure model is appealing because it makes { 1,2, ..., n } wish to solve the election problem: at any point, no more than one process of the set can be the leader, and as long as all processes do not fail, it is always the case that there will eventually be a leader. Assuming a fail-stop failure model leads to a very simple solution. Each process maintains a local copy of the list (1, 2, ..., n ) , and the first element of this list denotes the leader. When process i detects the failure of process j , i removes j froms its local copy of the list. When i finds itself the first element of its list, a' knows that it is the leader. Since a process becomes the head of the list only when all lower-numbered processes have failed, there is no more than one leader at any time; and, as long as a process eventually detects the failure of the lower-numbered processes, it will eventually become the leader.
A serious limitation of assuming a fail-stop failure model is that it is often an unrealistic assumption. In particular, in an asynchronous distributed system (i.e., a system with no shared memory, arbitrary message delivery times, no global clock, and arbitrary process speeds) in which crash failures can occur, the fail-stop model cannot be implemented. This is because it is impossible to reliably detect crash failures in an asynchronous system (see Theorem 1).
Several asynchronous message-passing systems (for example, [2,1,10]) have been implemented that supply a group membership service [12] . A group membership service allows a group of processes to agree on which processes are operational and which have failed. Hence, a group membership service supplies, among other properties, an abshaction similar to the fail-stop failure model. Since implementing the failstop failure model in an asynchronous system is not possible, each group membership service must settle for implementing an approximation of fail-stop. What that approximation is can be found by looking at the specifications of the individual group membership ser- ' vices.
There are many ways one might approximate failstop. In this paper, we consider one approximation that provides a subset of useful properties of fail-stop. We do so by introducing the concept of indistinguish,-able failure models. Informally, two failure models are indistinguishable if a process cannot determine which of the two failure models is in effect. We show that one can implement a failure model that is indistinguishable from fail-stop, and present one such model, called simulated fail-stop. We give lower bounds on the number of processes needed for a one-round implementation of the simulated fail-stop model to tolerate t crash failures, and show that these bounds hold for any model that is indistinguishable from fail-stop. Finally, we show that the bounds are tight by giving a protocol that attains them.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the system model used throughout the paper, including notation, definitions, and a formal logic used to describe system properties. Section 3 specifies the fail-stop and simulated fail-stop models, introduces the notion of indistinguishability of failure models, and proves that certain conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for a failure model to be indistinguishable from fail-stop. Section 4 gives lower bounds on the number of processes needed to tolerate t failures for one-round failure detection protocols implementing the simulated fail-stop model, and shows that these bounds hold for any model that is indistinguishable from fail-stop. Section 5 shows that these lower bounds are tight by presenting a protocol that meets them. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the work that remains to be done on this topic.
System Model
We consider a distributed system consisting of a set of n processes P = {1,2,. . . , n } . A process fails by simply stopping execution (crashing), and a failed process does not recover. The system is asynchronous, meaning that the rate of execution of any process with respect to any other is unbounded and there are no physical clocks. Between any two processes i and j there exist two unidirectional FIFO channels: Ci,j from i to j and Cj,i from j to i. Processes communicate only by sending and receiving messages over these channels. The channels are nonfaulty: they do not lose, generate, or garble messages. Message delivery time is unbounded. We assume for simplicity that channels have infinite buffers and that all messages m are unique (they can easily be made so by including in m its source and a sequence number). The state of a channel is the sequence of messages that have been sent along the channel but not received along the channel.
A process is defined by a set of states, one of which is denoted the initial state. The state of a process i consists of the values of all internal variables of the process, plus the values of n + 1 additional boolean variables that are defined as follows:
crashi. This variable is initially false and can become true at any time. Once crashi becomes true, the state of e' does not change further. (This models the failure of i.)
V j E P : failed,(j). This variable is initially false for all values of j, and becomes true when i detects the crash of process j. Once failed,(j) becomes true, it remains true forever. Exactly when faile&(j) becomes true with respect to when crashj becomes true is discussed in this paper.
A global state of the system is a set of process and channel states. An initial global state is the global state in which each process state is an initial state and each channel state is the empty sequence.
An event e is an action that changes the global state of the system from C to C' such that E' differs from on i before e occurs, and the states of the channels incident on i after e occurs. Let X j j be the state of channel Ci,j before e occurs. Let Xi,* be the nt,uple ( X C ,~, X i , 2 , . . . ,Xi,n) and let X*,a be the n-tuple ( X l , a , Xa,j,.. ., X,,a). Similarly, let X : , j be the state of channel Ca,j after e occurs, and let X:,i be the ntuple A';,+, . . . , X h , i ) . Then, e is defined by the 7-tuple (i, s,s',Xi,*, X : , * , X * , i , X t , i ) , such that:
X i , j # X l , j , and X ! . = ( X ; j :: m) for some message m (where :: is the catenation operator).
if X * , ; # A':,; ( e is a receive event), then X i , * = X i , * , there exists exactly one j # i such that X i , , # X i , ; , and (m :: X i , ; ) = X j , i for some message m.
2: J
We will use the functional notation e ( C ) = E' to denote that e occurs in global state C and results in global state C'. We define special events, runs, and predicates formally in [14] . Informally, send, receive, crash, and failure detection events are defined as follows: Note that for any run r, ' H,. is uniquely determined. Furthermore, r can be constructed from a history 'HT and the initial global state CO.
Throughout this paper, we use the notation X,. = 
. )
. This denotes that E,. is of the form (2; e;; y; e j ; z ; ek; w), where e i , e j , and ek are events, 2, y, and z are finite sequences of events, and w is an infinite sequence of events.
We specify properties of systems using predicate logic over global states and linear-time temporal logic over (infinite) suffixes of runs ([ll] ). We define the Note that it is possible that both CRASH^ and CRASH^ hold in some global state yet neither i failed before j nor j failed before i .
We use a version of the happens before relation of [9] . Given two events el and e z , define el -+ e2 (read "el happens before e2") in some history 'Hr if one of the three following conditions holds:
1. el and e2 are of the same process, and either el = e2 or el precedes e2 in 'Hr;
3.
there exists an event e such that el --* e and e + e2.
The happens-before relation as defined here is the same as that given in [9] , except that our relation is reflexive. This is for notational convenience. Note that for all el # e2, el -+ e2 implies that el precedes e:! in Xr. The converse does not hold, however.
Let T be a run. Let ri be the sequence of states of i in r , with repeated states removed (i.e., so that adjacent states are distinct). If 2 and y are runs, then we say that run x is isomorphic t o run y with respect to process i, denoted 2 ~i y, if and only if z j = yj. In other words, x =i y if and only if runs 2 and y are indistinguishable to process i. Similarly, TQ for Q P is the sequence of states of processes i E Q in r 
Specification of Failure Models
A failure model describes the manner in which the components of a system can fail. For our purposes, a failure model constrains how crash events and failed events can occur with respect to each other. We give these constraints as a set of properties and define the failure model as the set of runs that satisfy these properties.
The Fail-Stop Failure Model
The minimal set of fail-stop assumptions found in the literature is that in any infinite run of the system, a process's failure is eventually detected by all processes that don't crash, and that there are no false detections of failure. These two conditions specify the failure model defined in [16] . Hence, we adopt this as the definition of the fail-stop failure model. Formally, the two fail-stop conditions are:
( F A I L E D~(~) J C R A S H~)
We denote with FS the set of runs satisfying properties FS1 and FS2. 
Indistinguishable Failure Models
A process determines which event to execute based on its state and the messages that it has received. A run r is isomorphic to a run r' with respect to a process i if i executes the same events in both r and r'. We know that the two runs are isomorphic with respect to i if i starts in the same initial state in both runs, receives the same messages in the same order in both runs, and makes the same nondeterministic choices (if any) in both runs. Consider a run r of a system. If r is not in FS but is isomorphic with respect to i to a run T' in FS, then the events i executes are the same as if it were running in a system satisfying the fail-stop assumptions. Hence, if r ~p r', then no process in P can determine that r is not in FS.
Definition 5 A faalure model M is indistinguishable from ihe fail-stop model af f o r any run r E M , there exists a m n r' E FS such that r --p r' (that is, r is indistinguishable from r' to every process in P).
Consider the election protocol described in Section 1. If a run of this protocol is in a failure model M that is indistinguishable from but not identical to FS, then there may be more than one leader in some global state, but no process will be able to determine this. Internally the execution is the same as if there were only one leader at a time, because every process takes the same actions that it might take if the protocol the run were in FS. Therefore, any safety properties that the election protocol ensures under fail-stop will also hold under simulated fail-stop.
Recall that the reason that FS can not be implemented in an asynchronous system is because the crash of a process cannot be reliably detected. A failure model M that can be implemented and is indistinguishable from FS must be weaker than FS. However, it cannot be too weak; at the very least, a process i must not be able to determine that some process j executes an event after i detects that j has crashed. Furthermore, if a process detects the failure of i then i must crash at some point, and process crashes must have been able to occur in some total order. Hence, the following three conditions are necessary for indistinguishability from FS. FAILED,, (22)hFAILED,, ( 2 3 ) h . . .hFAILED,,-, ( Z k ) (j), sendi(k, mk) , and recvj(!, mj) in order to satisfy the happens-before relation. However, for r' to satisfy FS, crashj must occur before fuiledj(j) in IH,, . This means that in Z,I, crash, must occur before recvj(t, m,) , which contradicts the definition of crashj. Therefore, there is no run 0 r' isomorphic to r that satisfies FS.
Condition 1
We have shown that Conditions 1 , 2 , and 3 are necfail-stop. However, these conditions are not sufficient.
Condition For
Tuns '9 be an event essary for a failure model to be indistinguishable from e of process j such thal failedi(j) + e in I H r . It is impossible to satisfy all of these ordering constraints in a valid run. Therefore, there is no run r' 0 isomorphic to r that satisfies FS.
Theorem 3 implies that a failure model M that satisfies Conditions 1-3 may not be indistinguishable from FS. In the next section, we give a set of conditions that are sufficient, though not all are necessary.
Simulated Fail-Stop
We give four properties that comprise a model that is indistinguishable from fail-stop. We call this model the simulated fail-stop model (sFS).
To construct conditions for the sFS model, we weaken one of the conditions of the fail-stop model. Weakening FS1 yields a model in which some failures may be undetected. Under such a model, it could be impossible for a system to make progress. Therefore, we follow [4,3,12] and weaken FS2. This yields a model in which nonexistent failures may be detected.
FS1 is a liveness property. It can be trivially implemented by having each process detect the failure of every other process. Such an implementation would not be useful in practice. In a real system, it would be implemented using timeouts: each process would periodically send a message to every other process. If process i were not to receive a message from process j within some predetermined length of time, then i would (perhaps erroneously) detect the failure of j . The usefulness of this method depends on the amount of synchrony present in the system. We assume for the remainder of this paper that there is some mechanism provided by the underlying system to implement FS 1.
We replace FS2 with the following four conditions:
sFS2a: V r , i , j : r b O ( F A I L E D~(~) j OCRASH~)
This condition states that if process i detects that process j has crashed, then eventually j will crash even if i's detection was erroneous. In conjunction with FS1, this condition implies Condition 1: if fuifedi(j) occurs in X,, then crush, occurs in X,.
sFS2b : The failed-before relation is always acyclic. This is Condition 2.
sFS2c: Vr, i: r + O-FAILED~(~)
This condition states that a process never detects its own failure. That is, fuiledi(i) does not occur in ' H,. This condition states that once i detects the failure of j , then any subsequent messages sent by i to any process k will not be received until IC has also detected the failure of j . That is, if send;(IC,m) OCcurs after fuiiedi(j) in ' H,, then fuiled,(j) occurs before reevt(i, m) in %, . Properties sFS2c and sFS2d together imply Condition 3, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma4 If sFS2c and sFS2d hold in a ran r , then there cannot be an event e of process j such that failedi(j) 4 e in X r . The failed-before relation is acyclic. sendi(k1, nul) -recvk,(i, mkl) -s e n & , ( h , ma) -. . . -+ reevj(kt, mkt+l) -e . From sFS2d, each process in this chain, including j , must have detected the failure of j by the time it receives its message. Therefore, failed,(j) must occur in X,, which contradicts sFS2c.
P k O [ F A I L E D~(~)
A
0
The sFS conditions are summarized in Figure 1 .
Theorem 5 The simulated fail-stop model (sFS) is indistinguishable from the fuif-stop model ( F S ) .
The full proof of this theorem is given in [14] An outline of the proof is given below.
Consider a run P that satisfies FS1 and sFS2a-d but violates FS2.
Then, there exists at least one pair of processes i and j such that T + for all i,j in X r l .
O(FAILED,(~)
Lower Bounds
The simulated fail-stop properties (FS1, sFS2a-d) put restrictions on the way in which failures are detected. Implementing these properties requires that processes follow a protocol for detecting failures. In this section, we give lower bounds on message complexity and replication for failure detection protocols implementing sFS.
A one-round protocol for detecting a failure is one in which each process i exchanges one round of messages with other processes before executing failedi(j). Any protocol simpler than a one-round protocol would allow at least one process to unilaterally detect the failure of some other process. Such a protocol, however, would limit which processes another process could detect as faulty. For example, suppose that process i can unilaterally decide that process j has failed. Process i can execute faile4(j) concurrently with any event of process j , and so process j can never execute failedj(i). Hence, we will consider the class of one-round protocols in order to determine message and replication complexity.
We say that a process i initiates a failure detection protocol when it "suspects" the failure of another process j (e.g., due to a timeout at a lower level). In the first half of the round, process i sends a message to all other processes; in the second half of the round, processes send an acknowledgement message to i . We call the first message S U S P~J and the acknowledgement message ACK.SUSP~,, . Upon completion of the failure detection protocol, i will execute either erask or failedi(j) for some j # i.
A one-round protocol that implements sFS must avoid cycles in the failed-before relation since all runs in sFS satisfy sFS2b. Implementing sFS2b requires that in any run there is at least one process that participates in all failure detections. To see why this is so, consider the problem of avoiding cycles involving exactly two processes. Suppose that process a suspects the failure of process b. Before U can execute failed,(b), the failure detection protocol must ensure that faikdb(a) has not been executed and that failedb(a) will not be executed in the future.
The failure detection protocol cannot require a to communicate with b directly, because b may have indeed crashed. Therefore, the protocol must require a to receive information from, and distribute information to, other processes. In particular, a must receive information from enough other processes to be sure that faileda(u) has not been executed, and o must distribute information to enough other processes to be sure that if failed,(b) is executed, then failedb(a) will not be executed in the future.
The relevant information that a must disseminate is that a suspects the failure of b. In order for a to know that this information has been received by other processes, it must receive messages from other processes acknowledging that the failure of b is suspected.
Definition 6 The quorum set &ij of failedi(j) i s the set of processes from which i has received acknowledgement messages relating to its suspicion of j ' s crash. Formally, &ij = {k E P : SEND~(~,SUSP~,,) A
R E C V~(~, A C K . S U S P~,~) } .
The set &,a must be large enough to ensure that b, after hearing from &a,, will not execute failedb(a). In particular, the sets Q a b and &aa must have a non-null intersection.
We call this property the Witness Property (W), because the quorum sets for any two failure detections must have at least one process (the witness) in common. It is shown in the proof of Theorem 6 that the same property must hold in order to avoid cycles of any size. To see why this is so, consider three processes i, j , and k. It is possible for these processes to execute failedi ( j ) , failedj (IC) , and failedk (i) if any two of the quorum sets &i,, & j k , &hi intersect, but not if all three intersect.
The Witness Property can be stated formally as follows:
That is, there is some process w that is in the quorum set of all failure detections. Note that this is a stronger condition than what is necessary, for example, in the update of replicated variables [SI in which only each pair of quorum sets must intersect. Since sFS2b (Condition 2) is necessary for indistinguishability from FS (see Section 3.2), Theorem 6 implies that W is necessary for any one-round protocol that implements a failure model indistinguishable from FS. Let t be the maximum number of crashes in any run, including those that arise from erroneous suspicions. The necessity of the Witness Property places a constraint on t as a function of n and on the number of messages that a process must wait for before detecting a failure.
The simplest way to ensure that W holds in a oneround protocol is to require a process to wait for responses from every other process, except for those that are suspected to have failed, before detecting a failure. If there is always at least one process that never fails, nor is suspected of failing, then this process will be a witness to every failure detection that is executed.
This implementation only requires that t < n. However, if n is large and t is small, then each failure detection requires a process to wait for many messages, which in practice could take a long time.
An alternative implementation is to require a process to wait for a fixed, predetermined number of responses before detecting a failure. This approach reduces the size of the quorum for which a process must wait, but it places a stronger restriction on the number of failures that can occur.
Theorem 7 If the size of the quorum set is a fixed and equal size for each failure detection, then to guarantee that r + OW when t failures are possible, the size of each quorum set must be siricily grealer than n ( y ) .
PTOOf: We assume that in any run, no more than t failures will occur. Therefore, the largest possible cycle in a run satisfying (simulated) fail-stop involves t processes. We must guarantee that any t quorum sets &I . . .Qt have a nonempty intersection.
Let the size of a quorum be z. Let y = n -z. Proof: In a one-round protocol, the size of the quorum is equal to the number of A C K . S U S P~,~ messages that process i must receive before executing failedi(j).
Since i is in its own quorum, i must wait for In( y)J messages before detecting j ' s failure. In order for the one-round protocol to make progress, at least this strictly greater than n( F).
many-other processes must remain alive. Therefore, we have
Upper Bounds
We give an informal and simple one-round protocol that implements sFS2a-d. We assume that a failure can be suspected spontaneously (e.g., due to a timeout), but that no more than t failures are suspected in any run. In this protocol, s u s P i , j = A C K . S U S P~,~ = " j failed".
0 When process i first suspects the failure of process j , i sends the message " j failed" to all processes (including itself). Process i waits for messages of the form " j failed" from other processes and takes no other action except for acknowledging "2 failed" messages until it completes the protocol or crashes.
0 When process i has received messages of the form "j failed" from more than n ( y ) processes (including itself), i executes failedi(j).
0 When process z receives a message of the form "z failed", z executes crush,.
0 When process z receives a message of the form ''y failed" and z does not suspect the failure of y, z suspects the failure of y and executes the first step of the protocol.
We argue informally that this protocol implements the simulated fail-stop properties. sFS2a: Process i cannot execute failedi(j) without sending a message of 'the form ''j failed" to all other processes, including j . Since channels are nonfaulty, j will eventually receive such a message, upon which j will crash.
sFS2b:
The full proof is given in [14] . We give an outline of the proof for cycles of length 2. Suppose that the protocol generates a run T such that
T ,k OW holds. Therefore, there is some witness w such that i received " j failed" from w and j received "i failed" from w . Process w sends these messages to all processes. If w sends " j failed" before it sends "i failed", then process j will receive "j failed" and crash before it can execute fuiledj(i). Similarly, if w sends "i failed" before it sends "j failed", then process i will receive "i failed" and crash before it can execute fuiledi(j). Therefore, it is not possible for both failedj($ and failedj(i) to be executed in a run. 
Discussion
In Section 3.2, we showed that Conditions 1 , 2 , and 3 are necessary for any failure model to be indistinguishable from the fail-stop model. In Section 4, we showed that the Witness Property is necessary for any one-round protocol implementing Condition 2. We then showed that the Witness Property imposes lower bounds on the number of messages that must be received before a failure can be detected and on the number of failures that can be tolerated in a system.
We gave a protocol in Section 5 to demonstrate that these bounds are tight. This protocol, however, was derived from conditions that are not necessary for indistinguishability. There may be a failure model weaker than sFS that is indistinguishable from FS. However, such a failure model is subject to the same bounds on t as sFS, and so we do not expect such a failure model to be substantially more interesting than sFS.
The bounds on t arise from sFS2b. Hence, if a system did not require its failure detector to satisfy sFS2b, then less replication would be needed. Furthermore, a failure model satisfying only the other sFS assumptions would not require a process to wait for any messages before detecting a failure: the other sFS properties can be implemented simply by having process i broadcast a message "j failed" after suspecting j's failure and before unilaterally executing fuiled,(j). Such a failure model would, of course, be distinguishable from FS, but if a collection of processes are insensitive to cyclic failures, then they could be run in this cheaper simulated failure model. We do not know of any applications in the literature that are insensitive to cyclic failure detection, however.
As an example of sensitivity to sFS2b, consider the problem of determining the last process to fail ( [17] ). Solving this problem requires that processes record information about the failures that they detect (that is, their view of the failed-before relation). Then, when processes are recovering after a total failure, the recovering processes can determine when the last processes to fail have recovered. If cyclic failure detection is possible, then the problem is not solvable. For example, suppose P = {1,2}, process 1 falsely detects 2's failure, and then crashes. Process 2 detects 1's failure, proceeds with its work, and finally crashes. If process 1 were to then recover, it would conclude that it was the last to fail. In general, if cyclic detection is possible then the only possible recovery is to always wait for all crashed processes to recover.
Our results can be couched in terms of the failure detector hierarchy presented in [4,3]. The fail-stop failure model is equivalent to having a Perfect Failure Detector, and the properties that we assume are supplied by a Strong Failure Detector-that is, a failure detector in which at least one nonfaulty process is not suspect,ed of having failed. Hence, we have shown that while a Perfect Failure Detector cannot be implemented on top of a Strong Failure Detector, a failure detector indistinguishable from a Perfect Failure Detector can be implemented.
Existing group membership protocols implement specifications that are stronger than simulated failstop. One can ask whether they implement a simulation of a stronger version of fail-stop than FS, and if so, at what cost. For example, the Consul group membership service [lo] has the surviving processes agree on the last message sent by a failing process in a conversation. This resembles a model of failstop in which all messages that a process sends are received before its failure is detected. We believe that there is no failure model that is implementable in an asynchronous crash failure model and that is indistinguishable from this stronger definition of fail-stop. There is, however, a failure model that is indistinguishable from this stronger definition of fail-stop to the processes that are not forced to crash. As another example, the Isis group membership service [12] implements a failed-before relation that is totally ordered, and hence transitive. We believe that there are no one-round protocols that implement a transitive failed-before relation. There are multiround protocols that do achieve transitivity, however.
The protocols described in this paper are very simple (although expensive in the number of messages sent) and are easily implementable. Like the Isis system, we assume that once a process z suspects that another process y is faulty, z will not change its mind [13] . Such an assumption can theoretically lead to problems, since it can lead to excessive failures. Hence, the value of such a system depends on how accurate a suspicion actually is. The Isis failure detector illustrates that failure detectors can be sufficiently accurate in many workstation environments. On the other hand, since simulated fail-stop is defined without reference to a group, one could use our protocols to implement a failure detector on top of any kind of lower-level communication, including point-to-point communication.
